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PROFESSOR LANGBEIN AND SOCIAL INVESTING:
A COMMENT*
WINSTON P. NAGAN**

John H. Langbein, Max Pam Professor of American and
Foreign Law at the University of Chicago, has been a prolific
writer on the subject of social investing.' In a field that most
frequently attracts the commentary of liberals, Professor
Langbein stands out as a voice of reactionary radicalism. Seeking to sever liberals from their favorite divestment campaign
targets, pension trusts and university endowments, he concentrates on the trust responsibilities deemed to bind the managers
of such funds. In advocating a course of maximum diversification, he concludes that the prudent course for such fiduciaries is
to avoid making any decision on either economic or social
grounds.2 By holding every stock in proportion to its share of
the aggregate value of the market, a trustee can minimize risk,
* 0 1986 by Winston P. Nagan
** Professor of Law, University

of Florida. Prof. Nagan will explore some related
issues in Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, InternationalLaw, U.S. Foreign
Policy, and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 2 FLA. INT'L L.J. (1986) (forthcoming).
1. Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and Illegal, in NAT'L LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, DiVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT PRODUCTIVE? (1985)[hereinafter Langbein];
Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72

(1980)[hereinafter Langbein & Posner III]; Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and
Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 [hereinafter Langbein & Posner
II]; Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1 [hereinafter Langbein & Posner I].

2. "From the standpoint of economic analysis, there are two types of social-investing
outcomes - the futile and the wealth-impairing." Langbein, supra note 1, at 16.
Pension trusts have been designed to provide retirement security, and charitable trusts have been designed to serve specialized purposes-in education, the
arts, research, and so forth. A board of trustees is not well suited to be a forum
for the resolution of complex social issues largely unrelated to its work. There is
every reason to think that trustees will best serve the cause of social change by
remitting the advocates of social causes to the political arena, where their proposals can be fairly tested and defined, and if found meritorious, effectively
implemented.
Id. at 28.
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avoid research costs, and shrug off the demands of divestment
activists as contrary to this eminently rational investment
strategy.3
Langbein's general strategy is to condemn social investing
as unlawful and immoral. His article has been primarily, but not
exclusively, concerned with the problems associated with private
and public sanctions against South Africa. We may note
parenthetically, that South Africa, with its highly visible race
problems, is a particular concern in American politics.'
Langbein's core ideological concern seems to be the eradication
of "social investing;" indeed, his objective appears to be the extinction of social investing as a form of political and moral pressure on the American corporate and economic presence in South
Africa. From the perspective of what we may for convenience
call the "Chicago School," social investing may be viewed as a
negative economic externality. 5 That is to say, social investing is
an alien, intrusive, liberal, socialistic idea the insidiousness of
which erodes both the economic purity and the moral foundations of the investment market.'
Langbein's thesis grounds two claims. First, that social in3. Langbein, supra note 1, at 14-15, Langbein & Posner I, supra note 1, at 27, and at
29-30. "The essence of this strategy is to buy and hold a very broadly diversified portfolio- ideally, one in which all securities would be held in proportion to the market value
of the companies issuing them." Langbein & Posner II, supra note 1, at 3. The reduction
in administrative costs by maximum diversification at some point increases administrative costs in handling the amount of material generated by each corporation for its stockholders, requiring the trustee to limit the size of his portfolio. See id. at 4-5 n. 9, for the
genesis of this trade-off.
4. See, e.g., Buchanan, Destroy South Africa to Save It?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1986,
at A31, col. 1. Cf. Baker, A Matter of No Fact, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1986, at A23, col. 1:
One of the mysteries is why President Ronald Reagan is soft on South Africa.
He is government apparently operating under the fatal decision that Nazi Germany did things right. It now has more people imprisoned without due process
of law than the United States Immigration Service and exercises a press censorship that makes the Soviet Union's seem sissified by comparison.
5. Langbein, supra note 1, at 8, "[s]ocial investing proposals are directed at pension
funds not in order to further the interest of the pensioners, but in disregard of their
interests."
6. Langbein, supra note 1, at 8, "the causes that are grouped under the social-investing banner are those that have failed to win assent in the political and legislative process." (emphasis in the original). Cf. Barber, A New Language for the Left: Translating
the Conservative Discourse, HARPER'S, Nov. 1986, at 47, 48. "It is through city and
county institutions that government achieves many of its most innovative and satisfying
solutions."
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vesting in the context of pension trusts and charity law is unlawful.7 Second, that if social investing were not prohibited under
existing law, it ought to be prohibited.8 Langbein maintains that
social investing is unlawful and that there are external reasons,
possibly moral ones, that support his legal conclusion. Langbein
does not state that fields such as charity or trust law forbid social investing. Instead, he suggests that "the traditions" of these
fields require trustees to ignore social investing. Should the law
fail to generate enough legal support for his conclusions, he
would ostensibly seek support in the "rightness" of his view
about those "traditions."' In other words, the conservative position on social investing would appeal to non-legal or "not technically legal" sources of law and morality.
Where one's ideological adversary does not confine himself
to the analysis of the state of the law as it is, one cannot narrow
one's focus of analysis, or the conclusions reached would not be
useful from a policy-oriented perspective. 10 Therefore, this article will discuss not only the legal issues Langbein raises, but the
ancillary themes which are clearly present, and those that are at
least incipient. The themes of this article will be presented in
the following sequence: (1) some moral concerns about the nature of social investing; 1 (2) the context of human rights values
and international law;' 2 (3) social investing in the context of
United States domestic policy;'" and (4) ideology, intellectual integrity, and academic law."'
7. Langbein, supra note 1, at 16-25.
8. Id. at 12-16.
9. Id. at 1, "This article is concerned to explain why the traditions of trust law, pension law, and the law of charity rightly forbid social investing." The ensuing discussion of
the Social Security system seeks to demonstrate "the dangers of exposing the retirement
income system to the winds of electoral politics." Id. at 2-3. Congress is not bound by the
same restraints as trustees, and the entire program is more of a "social investment" than
a trust. The difference between social spending and private property makes this analogy
tenuous at best.
10. Many sections of this paper draw heavily on the insightful work of Walter
Probert, a pioneer of "words consciousness." His jurisprudential writings are seminal for
the interrelationship of lawyering and communication responsibility. See generally W.
PROBERT, LAw, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1972); Probert, Words Consciousness
and the Control of Language, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 374 (1972).
11. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 21-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-101 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 102-117 and accompanying text. See also Bell, Strangers in Aca-
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THE NATURE OF SOCIAL INVESTING

Since the concept of social investing is a central focus of
Langbein's article and serves as his point of departure, a closer
examination of that concept is warranted. The concept of "social
investment" is an extremely broad one, so broad that one should
be skeptical about the sheer breadth it assumes in Langbein's
analysis. Since, in Langbein's terms, social investing seems to
function as an explanatory concept, it is worth noting the requisite caution that accompanies all forms of conceptualization. All
concepts about any phenomenon are of limited utility.' 5 The
"bottom line" is that all investment is "social investment"" and
demic Paradise:Law Teachers of Color in Still White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385
(1986), for a description of the academic castle inhabited by most, if not all, law professors which may explain their ability to distance themselves from a subject.
15. The concept cannot be allowed to replace the reality it is meant to describe. The
convenience of defining that which you will criticize is not to be minimized. "Meaning is
no more in words than color is in things, actually less so. Words may trigger meaning,
but no, we let them trigger meaning. What meanings we let them trigger turns on what
assumptions operate, or in the current vernacular, what conventions." Probert, Interpretation: Its Relevance in Courts, Criticism and Jurisprudence, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 1
(1985) (emphasis in original).
16. "Social investment" can be defined as "[tihe use of pension fund assets to achieve
various social and political goals in addition to the traditional goals of asset enhancement and security." Murrmann, Schaffer, & Wokutch, Social Investing by State Public
Employee Pension Funds, 35 LABOR L.J. 360 (1984).
Society depends on the processes of economics to meet its material needs, and where
society feels a need not recognized as important by economics, other value-institutional
priorities are called into play. Economics may be the prime method for determining what
needs are met, but it is not the only method. Indeed, the wealth variable is not the only
variable crucial to the realization of the common interest in human dignity, contrary to
the position of the Marxists in the Kremlin and the neo-scholastics of the Chicago
School. Where investment funds are not readily provided to bring a new product to market, social discontent can cause a reallocation of investment funds. For example, the cost
of testing a drug must be "invested" before it can be made available to its potential
market of patients. "[I]t takes capitalized costs of about seventy million dollars to bring
the average new drug to market nowadays." Miles, Hail to the Orphan, FORBES, May 23,
1983, at 83. A newly developed drug for a rare disease may have too small a potential
market to justify an investment of such magnitude on economic grounds. Activism on
behalf of patients who need such "orphan drugs" lead pharmaceutical companies to subsidize the production of some drugs; consequently, "a patient with heart disease may
have to pay more for his medication so that a child with cystinosis can obtain cysteamine." Martindale, The Drugs Nobody Will Make, HEALTH, Aug. 1982, at 40. Eventually, when activism could not sufficiently affect the economics of drug companies, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. 360aa-360ee (West
Supp. 1986)).
The bill authorized tax credits and grants to promote the development of these
rare-disease drugs. It also authorized seven years of exclusive marketing rights
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investment decisions to maximize profit, or anything else, are as
much a matter of social investment as purchasing an athletic
booster membership. 7 Since the conceptual basis behind
Langbein's idea of social investing is largely undefined, it provides little, if any, guidance between the trivial and the salient.
In Langbein's schema, it functions more as a straw man than an
analytical tool. In an open society, or at least a relatively open
one, any "demand perspective" 8 within the social process involving investment could merit Langbein's stigma of "social investing." What Langbein has done is to provide a slippery slope
with an endless slide, rather than a framework which requires
careful characterization and deep thinking. That framework, if it
were supplied, would place social investing in the context of a
social process, much of which cuts across state and national
lines. To create a defensible moral and legal analysis of the financial world, the critical question must be whether the investment process, or particular activities within that process, promote or frustrate the major purposes of the political and legal
culture of the entire community." To pose the issue starkly, one
might balance the rights of the beneficiaries of private pension
trust plans in Winnetka or Hyde Park, who may be concerned
about their economic security, against the rights of black South
for rare-disease drugs that were not patentable. Other sections of the measure
were designed to ease regulatory barriers for orphan drug approval by directing
the FDA to tell a manufacturer precisely what tests it would require before
granting approval to market a drug.
1982 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 490.
In a similar vein, medical research may be driven by fund-raising, where economic
and social forces reach a confluence. For example, telethons sponsored by Jerry Lewis
and Dennis James have raised millions of dollars for muscular dystrophy and cerebral
palsy, which were previously orphan diseases. The grandfather of such efforts, the March
of Dimes Campaign, contributed significantly to the development of polio vaccine.
17. One could specify that one's donation to the University of Chicago be used to
revive its extinct football program in the belief that football scholarships would bring
diverse viewpoints to the school's classrooms and provide a tougher proving ground for
economic ideas that may become associated with the school; academic investment, if you
will.
18. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 9. The trustee must decide from an office with
only one window: a window on economics. The "perpetual wave of political demands,"
id., will still wash upon him, but only deeply ingrained, or economically oriented principles will influence his decisions.
19. It is beyond the scope of this article to lay out a framework for how the world
should be organized, but all possible, peaceful tools should be available to philosophical
and political debates.
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African youths, who may be tortured with a sophisticated apparatus bankrolled by the investment practices of the trustees of
these pension plans, but the balancing should be done on a conceptual basis informed by the fundamental policies of the entire
community.2 0

II.

THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Antagonists of social investing, at least indirectly, profess a
moral predicate to their arguments.2" Therefore, academic protocol will not be violated by an appraisal of Langbein's position on
social investing in relation to the normative standards to which
he seems implicitly committed, and more importantly to the
normative standards of the inclusive community where investments take place. That inclusive community is the international
community, and its normative standards are the United Nations
Charter and the International Bill of Rights.22
20. B. Baldwin & T. Brown, Economic Action Against Apartheid: An Overview of the
Divestment Campaign and Financial Implications for Institutional Investor (a study
funded by The New World Foundation & the Africa Office of the National Council of
Churches, and available from The Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, NY
10038)(undated)[hereinafter B. Baldwin & T. Brown]. "In short, the apartheid regime
has conducted business with U.S. corporations in South Africa in fields directly related
to the oppression of blacks." Id. at 7. The Internal Security Act, §§ 51(1)(a) & 51(2)(b),
maintains that support for divestment is "subversion," punishable by five years to life
imprisonment. Id. at 3.
21. Langbein's most recent article was published by the National Legal Center for
the Public Interest. The name of the organization implies a moral predicate for the positions it propounds. However, while Langbein takes a poke at "social activism on the
political," Langbein, supra note 1, at 10, most advocates of social investing are associated with the left. Langbein prefers to reserve decision-making power from emotional
demagogues who disrupt or redistribute, id. at 2-3, to rational economic actors who maximize benefits through the free market. His strategy of depicting other advocates as extreme does not quite eventuate in a view of Langbein as a cool-headed moderate.
22. The U.N. Charter is part of the law of the United States, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at
71 (1948).
Although the Universal Declaration and the Charter provided an important
foundation, many important human rights were not binding upon states until
the passage of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49]. These 1966 covenants and the Universal Declaration form what has been termed the International Bill of Rights.
Hassan, Solidarity Rights: Progressive Evolution of InternationalHuman Rights Law?,
1 N.Y.L.S. HuM. RTS. ANN. 51 (1983). See also Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Pro-
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To make the values at stake more explicit, in this article,
the word "responsibility" will be used, at times, to normatively
constrain the concept of investment itself. The value questions
implicit in Langbein's articles raise concerns of personal responsibility for the protection and enhancement of values.23 The central issue here, as elsewhere in private and public life, concerns
responsibility. The concerns of responsibility mean that the individual or institution is accountable for the consequences or results of political, corporate, or investment behaviors.2 ' The question of responsibility has at least two salient levels within this
context. The first is the perspective of scholarly responsibility.
The scholar does not live in a moral vacuum.2 5 If he is to explain, describe, appraise, evaluate, and recommend, his value
scheme must be founded upon honesty and accountability. Second, active decison-makers often become associated with institutions in relevant fields, and have institutional values and stantection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982). By
forcing the world of investors to consult the world of international law, I mean only to be
consistent. Investments are made worldwide, and all standards should be considered.
Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to be less adventurous than they should be in
searching for laws that bind the individual.
23. Langbein's theory is "intrinsically standardless," Langbein, supra note 1, at 9,
but that just begs the question of where standards are necessary or allowed, and must be
accounted for in a theory. Corporations are allowed to make charitable gifts under the
assumption that as entities in our society they can decide to benefit society, and with the
understanding that such gifts will not ruin the corporation. W. FLETCHER, 6A CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 2939 (rev. permanent ed. 1981). The law of

trusts is now in the embryonic stage of not allowing such donations, or at most allowing
them where directly related to the trust's purpose, a stage corporations had to outgrow.
Id. at § 2938. As elements of society, these entities can articulate the concerns of society
as well as any other entities can.
24. Our greatest asset is our spirit: the spirit of political liberty and civic activism
evident in the towns Tocqueville toured on his journey across America in the
early 1830's; the spirit of adventure that once opened up the West; the spirit of
giving by which Americans have always shown themselves prepared to help their
neighbors and participate in voluntary associations without calculating the return on their altruism; the spirit of tolerance that permitted the victims of a
hundred worldly persecutions to find sanctuary here, and that made America a
nation that saw equality as a function of will rather than birth; the spirit of
patriotism that inspired the young to serve their country without the promise of
a free ticket to college; the spirit of democracy that made liberty not merely a
private matter but a matter of respect for the dignity of others.
Barber, supra note 6, at 51.
25. Of course, some academicians are merely apologists. See Bell, supra note 14, at
389-91, recounting the interaction of slavery and law in American history.
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dards impressed upon them.26 Since Langbein's work obscures
an appopriate focus of inquiry, the perspectives of scholarly observer, institutional apologist, and decision-maker are largely
undifferentiated, and the critic does not know whether his disagreement should be theoretical or practical.
Having raised the problem of values, Langbein does little to
illuminate the roles important in value clarification; nor does he
describe what values are at stake and in what contexts they are
important. Langbein apparently shares the attitude of those
lawyers who project conservative ideology as conventional morality, and then selectively cull from legal sources those elements
that support their ideological predispositions. A cardinal tenet of
conservative ideology is that corporations and other fiscal institutions have no
responsibility for their conduct other than profit
27
maximization.

The values that animate Langbein are those concerning the
protection of retirement income in the private sector.28 Langbein
makes an excellent case for the special status of the private sector retirement system and the importance it has for the financial
security of its elderly beneficiaries. If, as Langbein maintains,
26. The question of who should make investment decisions does not end with trustees. Bankers, corporate functionaries, arbitrageurs, and congressmen can benefit from
public debate by divestment advocates, no matter what the particular avocation is.
Somewhere in the chain a decision will be made, and Langbein's obfuscation denies the
eventual decision-makers a social basis for their decisions.
Many of the demands that are most intensely promoted are often less than comprehensive. Divided by the contending ideologies and systems of public order
(especially in the wealth process), conditioned by many variations of parochialism, and oriented toward the calculation of short-term payoffs, the constellation
of effective demands gives emphatic priority to the assertion of special interests
in defiance of the common interests that give expression to human dignity
values.
M.S. McDOUGAL, H.D. LASSWELL & L.C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
45 (1980).
27. The goal of a business corporation is to make profit. . .The only goal of a
business corporation is to make profit. . .More fully, the only goal of a business
corporation is to make the maximum possible profit. . .Completely, the only
goal of a business corporation is to make the maximum possible profit over a
long period.
Simpson, The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a Multi-level, Longitudinal Model of
Profit-Squeeze, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 859 (1986)(emphasis in original) (quoting J.E. CONKLIN,
ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL: BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA

28.

Langbein, supra note 1, at 1-3.

41 (1977)).
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the elderly are "neither affluent nor politically adventurous,"29
why do social investment ideologists target pension funds for the
fulfillment of their social agendas? 0 Langbein's principal criticism of social investment seems to lie in the strategies that he
presumes to be typical of social investing advocates. Their "hidden dynamic," he claims, seeks to take "advantage of the separation between the ownership and control of pension savings."'"
2
Phrased thusly, the conspiratorial overtones become palpable.
The reality of pension funds, with their unimaginable amounts
of capital, on the other hand, is that not only are they promoted
by federal and state law, but controlled and regulated as well."
29. Id. at 7.
30. The colloquy between Socrates and Cephalus that introduces Plato's Republic
addresses many salient issues for the uses of the wealth of the elderly. THE REPUBLIC OF
PLATO 27, Chapter I (F. Cornford trans. reprint 1980). Although the appetite of his mind
remains sharp as his other passions diminish, and although the imminence of death
makes him ponder whether there is an afterlife and whether he has "cheated or deceived
anyone even unintentionally or [was] in debt to some god for sacrifice," Cephalus, the
old man, bequeaths the philosophic discussion to younger men. Id. at 47. Socrates
contributes:
Those who have [made their own fortunes] are twice as fond of their possessions as other people. They have the same affection for the money they have
earned that poets have for their poems, or fathers for their children: they not
merely find it useful, as we all do, but it means much to them as being of their
own creation. That makes them disagreeable company; they have not a good
word for anything but riches.
Id. at 6.
31. Langbein, supra note 1, at 8.
32. It would not be a far leap to put words in Langbein's mouth accusing divestment
advocates of being Marxists alienating workers, who are pension beneficiaries, from the
fruits of their labor. But it would be quite an ideological pirouette.
In addition, there may be a class bias in market-holding against union members.
Part of the union member's pay is withheld from him for his retirement. The pension
beneficiary may thus be deprived of the chance to use this extra money as an entrepreneur, and provide for his own retirement.
Traditionally, the trustee has not been regarded as an entrepreneur. Trustees are generally not compensated for taking entrepreneurial risks or for being
able to spot promising new ventures; they tend to be selected for reliability in
preserving the capital of the trust rather than for flair in speculating and taking
risks.
Langbein & Posner II, supra note 1, at 12. More agressive investors with available capital will take advantage of opportunities denied to the little man personally and to his
trustee.
33. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West
1985). See also infra at note 73. One big question is who owns these funds. If the pension
plan is underfunded, Langbein accuses divestment advocates of stealing from old widows, see Langbein, supra note 1, at 4; if the plan is fully funded, Langbein advocates
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Since investment decisions, however complex, are hardly to be
viewed as politically or fiscally neutral , the central question of
any defensible moral order is how to prioritize the range of responsibilities that inhere in the management of such funds.3 4
Preservation and enhancement of the corpus are, of course, central and practical objectives. The framework of these concerns,
however, can surely accomodate other values, and the difficulty
in finding universal answers does not mean that questions cannot be posed for each individual to answer: What ethical and
normative standards besides the traditional standards of prudence and probity are important to the ethically responsible investor? And what level of risk is permissible in the diversification of the portfolio where the current investment advances
goals that are possibly inconsistent with the purposes of a charity trust or a university foundation? Also, how does one trade off
matters of risk in diversification against the possibility that
one's investment strategem yields corporeal gains at the expense
of the larger community's concerns for the protection of fundamental human rights?" These "conspiratorial hidden dynamics"
are the heart of ethical responsibility. These issues constitute a
significant challenge to the legal system and moral order. The
challenge, as I see it, is to employ institutions, resources, human
wit and ingenuity to satisfy as many key values as possible without undermining social process and exhausting economic and political capital.
Professor Langbein's claim that political causes should be
pursued in the "political" arena36 assumes that matters of ecospeculative investment so that gains may be withdrawn and added to company profits, or
losses made up as convenient, see Langbein & Posner I, supra note 1, at 33-34.
34. The basic assumption of Langbein's economic analysis is that investors are averse
to risk: "Economic theory implies and empirical study has confirmed that investors are
generally risk averse..." Langbein & Posner III, supra note 1, at 78; see also Langbein
& Posner I, supra note 1, at 9, and Langbein, supra note 1, at 20. More important values
than risk are recognized by our legal system in order to protect the innate dignity of
man.
35. The "systematic risk," see Langbein & Posner III, supra note 1, at 80, of the
world community may be reduced by a reduction in political tension, an "investment
strategy" not countenanced by the strategy of riding the market.

36.
Why not pursue political causes in the political arena? It is vital to understand
that, almost by definition, the causes that are grouped under the social-investing
banner are those that have failed to win assent in the political and legislative
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nomic salience have nothing to do with politics or law. More
than that, he suggests that investment decisions have nothing to
do with the distribution of power in society.37 Going beyond the
"classic liberal" position that allocation of economic power to
the private sector promotes democracy,38 Langbein suggests that
private actors may remain unaccountable for the social and political consequences of the exercise of their economic power. 3e In
short, private tyranny is seemingly more acceptable than public
tyranny; a brave moral conclusion indeed.
process. . . . The reason, therefore, that the proponents of social investing are
bullying pension trustees is that they have been unable to get their political programs accepted in the political process.
Langbein, see supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis in original).
Joseph Schumpeter suggested that democracy was little more than the name
of a system in which elites competed via the ballot for the support of an otherwise docile electorate, whose sole exercise of liberty was the occasional filling out
of a ballot. Both political parties embraced this definition. They nurture bureaucrats and "experts" to carry out the everyday functions of government and seek
charismatic leaders to act as media figureheads.
Barber,supra note 6, at 51. Cf. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 1001 (1965).
37. "This approach makes social investing a branch of interest group politics."
Langbein, see supra note 1, at 9. "Interest group politics" has its place and is outweighed
by the importance of preserving trusts. This merely reserves economic power for those
interested in preserving the status quo. Cf. Barber, supra note 6, at 49:
To the right, politics is a function of economics, without autonomy or sovereignty. As a consequence, important political issues are often decided on the
basis of whether one outcome or another will promote the free-market capitalist
economy or take us down the road toward a planned protosocialist economy.
38. Liberals in the nineteenth century sense "advocated freedom of the individual
and reduction of government power and control." Malloy, Equating Human Rights and
Property Rights - The Need for Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and
Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 164 (1986). This article delineates the major strains
of economic thought growing out of this tradition. For a prime example, see F. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). See also Kirkpatrick, Dictatorshipsand Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 34, for the application of this viewpoint to foreign
affairs.
39. The coercion of an individual by others is a prime evil for "classic liberals" except
for general rules enforced fairly by the government. See Malloy, supra note 38, at 168-71.
According to Langbein, the settlor of a trust can bind another individual, the trustee, to
his will as part of his employment. But the trustee should be immune to all other coercion except officially pronounced rules of society, or the settlor's liberty will be violated.
Were the left to advance a vision of local civic organizations using power for
public ends, neoliberals and conservatives alike would be put in the uncomfortable position of having to denounce such organizations in order to maintain their
support for the private market-which would then be revealed for the home of
oligarchy and monopoly that it is.
Barber, supra note 6, at 48.

HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL

[Vol. IV

Langbein lets the "political" cat out of the bag when he demands to know why South Africa, with its monumental race relations problems, remains a particular target of social investors,
while Libya and Russia are ethically treated with benign circumspect.4 0 It is by no means clear that moral condemnation is reserved exclusively for South Africans."' But it is a strange doctrine which suggests if one cannot address every conceivable
human rights violation in the world, one cannot address any of
them.42
If there is any commendable assumption pervading the
democratic ethos, it is that we are all in some degree responsible
for the decisions in public and private life that allocate weal and
woe. Langbein's proposition that there can never be a "consensus" about socially worthy causes is true,43 but beside the point.
The whole point of taking a value such as human dignity seriously requires recognition that its realization cannot ultimately
depend on someone else's action. The responsibility in the first
instance must be with the self. The most elementary forms of
republican government appreciate and understand this.
I do not intend to add an extended analysis to Langbein's
40. Langbein, supra note 1, at 10.
41. Never before has the United States witnessed such an explosion of non-federal legislation directed against a particular nation. State, county, and municipal
governing bodies have enacted dozens of statutes, ordinances, resolutions, and
orders, which, in the aggregate, almost certainly have affected relations between
the United States and South Africa.
Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 815 (1986). See also id. at 815 n. 14, discussing "similar measures against other nations," including Iran, Libya, Northern Ireland, and the Soviet Union.
42. Such an argument draws on the principles of equal protection, but in such a manner as has long been disfavored. "It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of
the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336

U.S. 106, 110 (1949). But see J. CAREY, UN

PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

(1970), especially at 143-53, Chapter 12, "The UN's Double Standard on Treatment of
Complaints."
43. "[Tlhere can be no consensus about which social principles to pursue and about
which investments are consistent or inconsistent with those principles." Langbein, supra
note 1, at 9-10. In mathematical terms, trust principles are constants, and social principles are variables; only a person just being introduced to algebra could think that he had
truly found the value of "x". Cf. Is Nothing Sacred? Constants of Science Submit to
Revision, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1987, at C3, col. 1 (discussing among other developments
the redefinition by Codata (Committee on Data for Science and Technology) of the
meter as "the distance over which light will travel in one 299,792,458th of a second").
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theory of the economics of investing. As a lawyer, I may indulge
myself in little more than the often made criticism of the dismal
science-it is a poor predictor." After disavowing expertise or
inclination to assail the academic tower of neo-scholastic economics, I still think it appropriate to harry Langbein's flanks
with some skepticism on that subject. Since Langbein's concept
of social investing is so broad that it can be used to prove almost
anything, including the assumption that it is futile,45 or impairs
the corpus and performance of pension trust funds, the question
of investor responsibility could more sensibly be explored in specific contexts, rather than generalization and speculation. 6 Indeed, the question of divestment by firms doing business in
44. See WHY ECONOMICS IS NOT A SCIENCE YET (A. Eichner ed. 1983). The business
judgment rule for corporate directors and the prudent man rule for trustees are in part
based on the presumption that predictions cannot be entirely accurate. W. FLETCHER, 3A
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1039-1041 (rev. permanent ed.
1986).
45. However one wants to define "futility," some commentators contend "[i]n one
respect at least, the divestment forces have already won. They have prevented - discouraged, dissuaded, whatever you call it - billions of dollars of new U.S. investments in
South Africa. They have discouraged new companies, new investors who were looking for
foreign opportunities from coming to South Africa." See B. Baldwin & T. Brown, supra
note 20, at 2 (quoting Financial Mail (Johannesburg, Feb. 1, 1985)).
46. Business Environment Risk Information (BERI SA), which specializes in risk
analysis for international corporations, has confirmed the wisdom of both the
general trend away from investments in South Africa and the decision of the
corporate insurance "troubleshooter" to move in, by recommending against long
commitments in a country which it sees as approaching high operational risk
and prohibitive political risk.
B. Baldwin & T. Brown, supra note 20, at 3.
By law, a black father who, being fortunate to get a job, must leave his
family in the bantustan homelands to eek [sic] out a miserable existence there
while he comes to the white man's town as a migrant laborer to live an unnatural
existence in a single sex hotel for eleven months of the year. He is, then, prey to
prostitution, drunkenness, and sodomy. The migratory labor system is the legal
policy of the land, eating away at the vitals of black family life, again, not accidentally, but of set deliberate government intent. That is how you keep the costs
of production low because the migrant is paid as if he were single. Now it is
important for those who invest in South Africa to know that it is this kind of
system, whether they like it or not, whether they intend it or not, it is this kind
of system which they buttress by their involvement there. To do this to human
beings, separate families in this kind of way, to a layperson seems wrong and
immoral. However, the sanctions and buttresses this system which even the
white Dutch Reform Church, which does not easily criticize the South Africn
[sic] government, has long ago condemned as a cancer in our society.
Tutu, The United States and South Africa: Human Rights and American Policy, 17
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985).
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South Africa requires a more careful assessment before the notion of futility is interposed. One needs to examine the conditions in South Africa, focusing particularly on the extent to
which involvement in the economy of apartheid reinforces the
institutions of apartheid, or conversely, serves to transform
South African society in ways that make it more consistent with
international law and morality.47 If the divestment strategies are
seen to provide possibilities for political change, then the question of economic futility is irrelevant since the more important
political and legal objectives of international moral order may be
realized. The question might then be one of political success at
an economic price. The question of the impairment of funds,
again in the context of South Africa, raises many more questions
of fact. Included among these are the escalating risks of investing in a society caught within the throes of great economic and
political turbulence, the political price of retaining investment in
South Africa to the exclusion of fiscally attractive possibilities
elsewhere, and of course the attendant transaction costs of divestment . 8 The point is that investment strategies are often tailored to specific situations. Therefore, generalization about socially conscious investment practices outside of a careful
appraisal of all the factors that condition performance in a given
place at a given time is a futile exercise.' 9
47. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22. Cf. "If the collapse of apartheid had to depend on the moral achievement of millions, on the simultaneous mass conversion of the oppressors and oppressed, it would probably never happen." J. LELYVELD, MOVE YOUR SHADOW: SOUTH AFRICA, BLACK AND WHITE 278 (1985).
48. Langbein would reply that the risk of investing in unstable countries has been
factored into the price of a stock by investment analysts and by the market quicker and
easier than any individual could calculate. The obligation to make one's own moral decisions is thus placed in another's hands. Plato's guardians made moral decisions based on
planes of philosophy unreached by the hoi polloi; Langbein cloaks his investment analysts with no advantage besides speed. There are more things on heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your economics.
The market holder still has to decide whether the market is efficient or not to decide
whether to maintain the market-holding strategy.
They [critics of this strategy] fail to realize that if these costs materialized-if
the efficiency of the market declined to the point where increased search would
yield a positive expected return, rather than negative as today-some passive
investors would shift back to an active strategy, and the process would continue
until the efficiency of the market was restored.
Langbein & Posner II, supra note 1, at 12.
49. According to Langbein, the strategy of picking stocks is futile, because the analyst can never have sufficient information to predict the future. Langbein, supra note 1,
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When we examine the context of South Africa, we may note
several things. First, there is thorough documentation on all aspects of South African economic, political, and social processes."
Second, without providing a detailed analysis, South Africa's
ubiquitous migratory labor system can fairly be characterized as
having some elements of a forced labor system. 51 Its political
processes take place under a constitution that explicitly precludes direct participation by the black population." As a result
of its continuous and systematic torture of its opponents, the
South African regime has earned the unenviable reputation of
being a leading force for repression in the world." The system of
at 12-16. For the socially concerned, the strategy of guessing whether a corporation will
act in a socially responsible manner is futile. For Langbein, the "competitive nature of
the capital markets," id. at 12, means divestors forgo opportunities that more aggressive
investors will snap up. But if the moral level of the marketplace is raised by divestment
advocates, the targets of aggressive investors will involve less aggression.
On the other hand, divestment may involve the sale of assets to groups of South
African managers who are more susceptible to the commands of the system of apartheid.
The Ambiguity of South African Divestment, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
These managers may finance their purchase by borrowing against the same plant that
the American company thought an unsafe investment, so that the asset of the divesting
company is no more secure.
50. The literature on this is vast, and much data is collected in the United Nations
Center Against Apartheid. See also, Possibility of a Resource War in Southern Africa:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); K. DANAHER,
IN WHOSE INTEREST (1984); G.S. HULL, PAWNS ON A CHESSBOARD: THE RESOURCE WAR IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA (1981); THE APARTHEID REGIME (R.M. PRICE & C.G. ROSENBERG EDS.

1980).

51.

On the extent of repression in South Africa, see AMNESTY INT'L, SOUTH AFRICA:
(1986). For a description of forced labor, see id. at

IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE PASS LAWS

Chapter 7. For an overview of South Africa's human rights record, see AMNESTY INT'L
REP. 1984 92-96, and AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1986 88-93.

52. L.J.

BOULLE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND APARTHEID

(1984), for a history of the

rewritings of the South African constitution and some proposals for change.
53. See AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1986. The expression of public opinion through the media and polls has reflected itself in the divestment debate. The poll taken by Professor
Schlemmer that shows blacks disfavor divestment was commissioned, some believe, "to
torpedo the divestment movement." See B. Baldwin & T. Brown, supra note 20, at 9.
The London Sunday Times poll reached a contrary result to Schlemmer, finding 77 % of
black South Africans support economic sanctions against South Africa. Sunday Times
(London), Aug. 25, 1985. See also M. ORKIN, DIVESTMENT, THE STRUGGLE, AND THE FUTURE

(1986).

Investment in South Africa was made a matter of national security by the National
Key Points Act. This law empowers the Minister of Defense to require that corporations
provide security for their facilities in cooperation with the South African Defence Forces.
The cooperation between capital and military in controlling the population goes far beyond the traditional protection of private property rights. See South Africa Fact Sheet
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censorship, in suppressing certain news, complicates the factgathering process, as in other closed societies."
International law has imposed an arms embargo on South
Africa that has been honored in substantial degree by the international community.5 The United Nations has consistently recommended economic sanctions to persuade South Africa to follow a path more in keeping with the civilized standards of the
U.N. Charter. The United States Congress has overwhelmingly
endorsed the principle of sanctions against South Africa to the
extent of repudiating a presidential veto. The Common Market
has endorsed limited economic sanctions against South Africa.
The Eminent Persons Group of the Commonwealth has come to
a similar conclusion. 6 In the Namibia litigation, the World
Court held that policies and practices of apartheid violated just
about every major purpose of the U.N. Charter, and recommended a range of steps by which the international community
could refrain from enhancing the standing of apartheid within
that community.57 Furthermore, the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid communicates
(1984)(published in cooperation with the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid)(The
Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, January 31, 1987, at 3, col. 4:
A result has been increasingly incomplete or distorted reporting in South
Africa. In its dispatches on a visit to Washington this week by the A.N.C. president, Oliver Tambo, the Government radio and television were permitted to
quote statements by Mr. Tambo supporting violent resistance. But newspapers
were not allowed to quote Mr. Tambo when he spoke of conciliatory or democratic goals.
Id. at col. 6. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1987, at Al, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1986,
at Al, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at A7, col. 1.
55. G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 102, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
See also The World Demands Sanctions: A Chronology, S. AFR., Mar. 1983, at 13-16.
Western Gunrunners, S. AFR., Jan. 1981, at 21. See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L.C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521 (1980).
56. For a brief summary, in an editorial, of the positions of the United States, Great
Britain, and the Commonwealth see Walk, Do Not Run, Out of South Africa, N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1986, § 4 (Week in Review), at 26, col. 1. On the report of the Eminent
Persons Group, see Excerpts From Report on South Africa by Commonwealth Mission,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at A13, col. 1. On the Commonwealth position see Lelyveld,
Commonwealth Delegates Drive for South Africa Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986,
at Al, col. 4.
57. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970)(advisory opinion). 1971 I.C.J. 16., see also UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, June 1971, at
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in unequivocal terms the condemnation the international community reserves for apartheid."8 In the light of these international statements, the idea that the transfer of capital to South
Africa is a purely neutral act, or is legitimate if all the investors
happen to be representing the beneficiaries of private pension
plans, can only arise from moral astigmatism. 9 From the standpoint of intellectual standards, this measure of moral selectivity
borders on dishonesty. One would have to be cynical to depict
issues of international peace and security, or massive violation of
human rights as simply a matter of interest group politics as
usual.6 0
In referring briefly to the codified expectations of the international community, the point is merely to show the incompatibility of apartheid with the obligations that states have under
the U.N. Charter. To the casual observer, that is almost beside
the point for the domestic law of investing, but when a theorist
endeavors to set out the law in its broadest and most inclusive
sense he should be consistent with all possible sources of author58. The insistence that apartheid constitutes a "crime against humanity" reached a
high point when the General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, GA Res.
3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No. 30) 756 in U.N. Doc. A/9030.
59. To the extent that the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, is at least viewed as having the status of customary international law, it is
worth recalling the gist of Article 2, § 1(c). This article supports the principle that states
"shall take effective measures to review governmental national and local policies and to
amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or
perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists." If investing in the economy of
apartheid, and benefiting from it, contravenes the mandate of the international law of
race relations, then the rules of municipal law that permit such conduct should be subject to this proscription.
60. The mass killings in South African townships cannot be compared to other atrocities. That is only because the abhorrent behaviors of Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Pinochet, Stalin, and Hitler should each be condemned in their own right. The number of postcards,
phone calls, or lunch invitations that an interest group can muster from the appropriate
group of emigres, refugees, or sympathizers should not determine international morality.
[A] global perspective is easily used to belittle the sufferings of particular
groups, to deny the significance of their history and particular circumstances. If
it can be shown that someone in Gdansk or Kampala or Lahore is worse off than
someone in Cape Town, then anyone in Cape Town who vents his unhappiness is
convicted of a lack of global perspective. I was never impressed by the line that
racial tyranny was easier to bear than Leninist totalitarianism. It struck me as
an unseemly calculation for anyone who has never borne either.
J. LELYVELD, supra note 47, at 17.
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ity. The Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations of the
United States (Tent. Draft No. 6) maintains that "[tihe Charter
of the United Nations has been adhered to by virtually all states
and even the few remaining non-member states have apparently
acquiesced in the principles it proclaims."61 Since Langbein relies on the provisions of domestic law to analyze the illegality of
social investing,62 and since many commentators have ignored
this point, it is important to address whether municipal law
standards might be fairly evaluated in terms of consistency with
international law standards promulgated by the U.N. Charter
and expressed by the practices of states that are operating under
the Charter. According to the Restatement, "[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to
bring it into conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States." 3 This section is a codification of the practice of United States courts that dates as far
61. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
comment h (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
62. By reducing the discussion of the interaction of law and economics to "neutral
principles," Langbein creates a series of buffers through which American political impulse must pass before impacting on South African political action, a process designed to
preserve the status quo even if reform takes place. Langbein's position expands traditional trust fiduciary obligations, but not in a manner that expands state control over the
business of investment. Indeed, South African business leaders have been laying the
groundwork for opening up South Africa society to adapt to the needs they see evolving
in their business culture. The South African business community has provided a modest
agenda that would completely undercut any support for economic sanctions. "South African businessmen have already defined what the Government must do: end the state of
emergency, release political prisoners, abolish apartheid, and start negotiating the political future of the country." Lewis, 'Sharp and Short and Dramatic', N.Y. Times, Sept.
26, 1985, A35, col. 1. See also Lewis, South Africa Says No, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1985,
at A19, col. 1.
Arguing that economic change is sufficient and political change unnecessary for the
present, American conservatives have relied on Lawrence Schlemmer's poll that "reveals
that more than 75 percent of black workers surveyed oppose divestment as a strategy to
liberate them." D'Souza, Liberals' Hypocrisy on South Africa, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22,
1985, at 13A. Working for freedom and equality through the layers of privilege that is
apartheid, however, leads only to more stratification and fragmentation, making politics
more intransigent. J. LELYVELD, supra note 47, at 93-101. E. Schmidt, One Step - In the
Wrong Direction: An Analysis of the Sullivan Principles as a Strategy for Opposing
Apartheid 11-17 (rev. ed. 1985)(available from Episcopal Church People for a Free
Southern Africa, 399 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012).
63. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 134
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
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back as 1804.64 In Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,
Chief Justice Marshall stated that "an act of congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains."6 The tentative draft of the Restatement also addresses the possibility of an ostensible inconsistency between international law and municipal law:6"
An Act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement as
law of the United States if the purpose of the Act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear and if the
Act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled." 6 7
A fair interpretation of this rule would suggest, for example,
that if policies and practices under ERISA were inconsistent
with a prior rule of international law, the ERISA standards
would prevail only if it can be shown that ERISA's purpose was
to supersede the international law rule." State legislation cannot
nullify international law in the same manner as federal legislation, however. State laws that are inconsistent with federally
adopted treaties or international law are pre-empted, as they
would be by any other federally enacted law."9 It should be
64. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
65. Id. at 118. The other aphorism born of admiralty jurisdiction is that
"[iJnternational law is part of our law." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
66. Municipal law concerning divestment can be federal, state, or local. It is used
here to mean "[tihat which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state, and
is thus distinguished from political law, commercial law, and international law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 918 (5th ed. 1979).
67.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

135

(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
68. ERISA would have to supersede all prior enactments, including treaties like the
U.N. Charter. In the same way that ERISA denies individuals and states the power to
allow a lesser standard for pension trusts, international human rights agreements deny
individuals the power to violate human rights. A treaty may increase the power of the
federal government to invade the liberty of individuals. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920). "Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can
be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power." Id. at 435.
There, the action was supposed to protect migratory birds, a lesser magnitude than
human life.
69.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

comment e (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985):
Since any treaty or other international agreement of the United States, and any
rule of customary international law, is federal law (§131), it supersedes any in-

135

100
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noted, however, that courts are not required to interpret municipal rules in such a mannner to avoid every possible violation of
international law where legislation has a clear intent to supersede international law. This principle would be most important
in the interpretation of common-law and statutory rules that alsuch as corporations, to function
low institutions,
70
extraterritorially.
III.

THE LAWFULNESS OF SOCIAL INVESTING IN DOMESTIC LAW

Professor Langbein's legal analysis focuses on pension trusts
and university endowments. As his and other writings elsewhere
indicate, a wide range of institutions have fiduciary duties regarding the management of a capital corpus. 71 The general
consistent State law or policy whether adopted earlier or later. Even a non-selfexecuting agreement of the United States, not effective as law until implemented
by legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to be federal policy
superseding State law or policy. In principle, a U.S. treaty or international
agreement may also be held to preempt a field or subject and supersede State
law or policy though it is not necessarily in conflict with the international
agreement.
70. For example, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd2, 78ff (West 1981) to prevent foreign bribery in commercial contexts from contributing
to problems in foreign relations, the perception of corporate immorality, and the erosion
of the free market system. A Comparison of the Foreign Corrupt Pratices Act and the
Draft InternationalAgreement on Illicit Payments, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795. This
clearly intended to limit the power of corporations based in the United States from acting in certain ways even outside the United States. On May 18, 1979, the United Nations
Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments adopted the draft report
(Agreement) of its first and second sessions, U.N. ESCOR, (2d regular session, agenda
item 9), U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (1979), which had the same basic aim as the FCPA - to
discourage illicit payments in an international context. Id. at 796. Although both use a
combination of disclosure and criminalization to achieve their goal, there are significant
differences between the two. Id. It has been suggested that before the United States can
lend support to the Agreement, the FCPA must be reconciled with the Agreement in the
following ways:
The type of business covered under the FCPA accounting provisions would have
to be expanded. Furthermore, the permissibility of "grease payments" under the
FCPA would have to be eliminated. Finally, United States foreign policy is not
in alignment with the Agreement's southern Africa provisions. The last objection
is mitigated, however, by the significant dissension over inclusion of the provisions in the final text and by the changing attitude of the United States towards
South Africa.
Id. at 822. The domestic law is arguably overreaching its jurisdiction, and the international law may not be applied by a court.
71. Langbein & Posner III, supra note 1, at 75. See also Troyer, Slocombe, & Bois-
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thrust of Professor Langbein's writings have been to pull most
charities within the ambit of common law trust traditions. 2 His
weakest arguments concern what may loosely be called charitable organizations, which include at least some university endowments. His strongest argument for imposing strict standards
deals with pension funds that are subject to ERISA.7 1 Quite understandably, his discussion begins with ERISA, in order to influence the characterization of all other fiscal institutions in the
direction of strict responsibilities. In effect, Langbein would prefer ERISA standards to be extended to all fiduciaries, because
these standards, actually tighter than common law standards,
are a step in the right direction, both morally and ideologically.74
This strategy has at least been partially successful in making the
responsibility of managers of charitable funds, whose standard
of conduct has been moving from the traditional trust model toward a corporate director model, an object of serious discussion
in academic literature. 75 To turn the table on Professor
Langbein, it is a good stratagem to start with his weakest argument, that concerning charitable organizations and come back to
the strictures of ERISA.
In their well-known article, The "Income" of Endowment
ture, Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations,
Other CharitableInstitutions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEo. L.J. 127, 129-30 (1985)[hereinafter Troyer].
72. Troyer, supra note 71, at 133 n. 11.
73. Langbein, supra note 1, at 16-24, discussing ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. §
1104(a)(1), from the Employees Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 10011461 (West 1985).
74. "Since the employee is in this important sense the 'settlor' of his own pensiontrust account, there is good reason to prevent plan sponsors (whether union or employer)
from using the authorization doctrine to impose social investing upon him." Langbein,
supra note 1, at 22. The individual is thus paramount and cannot be dominated by
others. However, as Langbein continues, the individual cannot be given any real choice
because society, through ERISA, has taken away the individaul's power to use these
funds for anything other than profit-maximization. Id. at 22-23. If society has overridden
the will of the individual with its official organs, what makes informal action such an
imposition? Governmental arbitrariness is supposed to be the nemesis of conservatives,
and here Langbein hides behind it to save himself from social pressure.
75. Troyer, supra note 71, at 132 n.11. In terms of Probert's law theory games, see
supra note 10, Langbein emphasizes ERISA to give his opponents the weakest counterargument. He criticizes his opponent's for merely playing the "feelings" game, and denigrates their sources of information. The true legal theorist would start with the idea that
there is no law, and that some set of information is accepted by all. Langbein defines
that there is a law, and that it fits the facts.
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Funds, Cary and Bright maintained that:
the law governing charitable corporations is not merely a
branch of trust law, or corporate law, or contract law, but
is sui generis, drawing to some extent from all three.
Where the issue involves the investment of funds.

. .

the

courts show a marked tendency to apply corporate principles rather than trust principles, in order to accord
charitable corporations a maximum degree of flexibility
in their operations. 6
In an early statement of the loosening of legal standards regarding charitable organizations, the Attorney General of New York
stated the principle as follows:
Unless modified by statute, charter or by-law, the powers
of the trustees of an educational, religious or charitable
corporation in respect to the administration and investment of the corporation's funds are fundamentally no
different than that of the directors of a business corporation in respect to the administration of property held by
the corporation. 7
76. Cary & Bright, The "Income" of Endowment Funds, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 40708 (1969). This article advocated, in the context of university endowments, the abrogation of the distinction between appreciation of a trust corpus which would belong to
remaindermen, and income of a trust which would belong to beneficiaries. The authors
found that "[llegal impediments which have been thought to deprive managers of their
freedom of action appear on analysis to be more legendary than real." Id. at 417. Having
perceived in court decisions "a marked tendency to favor charities in their disputes with
others over property," resulting in "corporate or trust law [being] used less for guidance
than to rationalize the desired result," id. at 411, the authors acknowledged that "Ithe
law is moving in the direction of applying to management of university funds the more
flexible principles applicable in the case of corporations." Id. at 396.
On the other hand, Langbein seems intent on freezing standards instead of letting
them evolve. For example, ERISA becomes the LaBrea tar pits in which pension trust
are to be fossilized. Langbein, supra note 1, at 6. Langbein and Posner's first article
begins with the South Sea Bubble of the 1700s which was essentially speculation without
substance. Langbein & Posner I, supra note 1, at 3. As a result of the Bubble's collapse,
laws governing finance were straitened. Id. Corporate law gradually escaped those strict
rules with industrialization and the growth of capital markets, and trust law has begun
to catch up. Id. at 4-5. Clinging to strict rules in the face of social investing by trusts
begs two questions: are trusts likely to be caught in the collapse of another Bubble; and
is it possible that South Africa, or another target of social investing, could be the genesis
of another Bubble.
77. N.Y. Arr'v GEN., 1951 ANN. REP. 159, 161 (citation omitted), cited in J. SIMON, C.
PowERs, & J. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR 143 (1972).
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This rule has since been codified in the Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act, which requires that trustees use ordinary business care and prudence in investment decisions.78 The
distinction between charitable trusts and charitable corporations, however, can be made and is made.7 9 Under this formalistic bifurcation, charitable corporations are governed by corporate standards, and charitable trusts are governed by trust
standards.80
Characterizing charities as corporate does not automatically
validate blunderbuss divestment. As broad as the protection afforded by the business judgment rule is, charitable directors
must still qualify for its protection by acting within its
requirements. 1
A careful and deliberate decisionmaking process is of
paramount importance. Moreover, in practice, it is important not only that there be such consideration, but
also that it be clearly documented in the organization's
records. Thus, the board's minutes should reflect a thorough consideration of the arguments relating to divestment. Before reaching a conclusion about the financial
cost of divestment, the directors should, with the aid of
qualified investment advisors, carefully review the investment implications of divestment and should ensure that
this review is clearly documented.2
In other words, in the case of charitable corporations, the business judgment rule requires that there be some reasonable basis
78. Unif. Management of Institutional Funds § 6, 7A U.L.A. 711, 721 (1985). In addition to the list of 26 jurisdictions that had passed this act or similar legislation in Troyer,
supra note 71, at 131-32 n. 10, North Carolina passed the act in 1985. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
36B-1 to -10 (Supp. 1985).
79. Most prior legal analyses of divestment have dealt with the issue in terms of
traditional trust law standards, focusing on the so-called "prudent man rule."
The resulting legal advice has generally been cautionary and restrictive. However, most charities are organized as corporations, not trusts, and review of the
modern law applicable to most charitable institutions considering divestment
reveals much greater latitude for governing boards to make good faith divestment decisions.
Troyer, supra note 71, at 129.
80. Id. at 130-31.
81. For an analysis of the business judgment rule with regard to divestment by charitable corporations, see id. at 134-38.
82. Id. at 144-45.
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for investment decisions. A divestment decision which advances
the interests of the corporation, among any of its constituencies,
could be considered reasonable, as would a decision in conformity with an international obligation." The liability of the directors would be minimal where the decision to divest minimizes
financial costs and assures long-term financial ends.84 The charitable purposes of the institution may also be advanced by divestment.8 5 For example, divestment may help a charitable organization clarify its role in the world by forcing a conscious
decision to promote human rights in the place of a half-conscious decision to invest in a corporation that is endeavoring to
develop technology aimed at the extinction of other races.8 Barring the narrowest definition of "profit maximization, "87 and
taking all factors into account, the board of directors of a chari83. The difficulty of determining what is in the interest of a charitable corporation is
compounded by the absence of marketplace determiners on which business corporations
rely. Share price and corporate raiders give business corporations a yardstick unavailable
to nonprofit entities. Kurtz, Non-Traditional Revenues Ventures of Tax-Exempt Organizations: The Role of Trustees, 39 REc. A. BAR. CITY N.Y. 129, 133 (1984).

84. The decision to divest is analogous to the decision to make a charitable donation,
which once was limited to gifts that could directly serve the interests of the corporation.
Garrett, Corporate Donations, Bus. LAW., Jan. 1967, at 297.
85. A charity's board may, in appropriate circumstances, reasonably determine
that adopting a divestment policy would strengthen the organization's credibility
when it adopts potentially unpopular positions on other issues, enhance its ability to appeal to certain groups for financial support, or improve its relations with
the community in which it is located or with communities otherwise important
to it.
Troyer, supra note 71, at 142.
86. The involvement of the corporate giant, I.G. Farbin, in the war effort and "final
solution" of Nazi Germany is the prime example of business leaders needing social protest to inform their "economic" decisions. See generally J. BORKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBIN (1980). The conflict between greed for profits and duty to humanity (or even nation) is too easily resolved by corporate functionaries in favor of the
former, as shown by the acts of Standard Oil, I.G. Farbin, and Ford Motors in funneling
supplies and technology to Germany during the '30s, and maintaining business as usual
during the war. Id. at 76-94. See also C. HIGHAM, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: AN EXPOSE
OF THE NAZI-AMERICAN MONEY PLOT 1933-1949, at 130-77 (1983). American subsidiaries
of German corporations even changed their names to prevent small stockholders from
learning they were financing Hitler. Id. at 134. After these stark examples, no voice for
humanity should ever be silenced, even by arguments from immutable principles of trust
law, and no social investor should be barred from investigating his company's activities.
87. Through a process of circular definition, Langbein determines that average return
is profit maximization, because attempting to maximize profits by picking stocks creates
risk of lower-than-average return by reducing diversification. Langbein & Posner II,
supra note 1, at 77-83.
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table corporation may legally divest, but, to borrow a word from
trust law, should do so prudently.18 Indeed, a decision to divest
in accordance with international law could hardly be viewed as
imprudent.
Some charities are organized as trusts rather than corporations. In those organizations, financial managers face more restrictive standards."' Encountering these standards on the heels
of corporate standards, one is lead to consider whether the restrictions are necessary, or even as explicit as is argued.' 0 The
88. "Prudently" does not always mean "conservatively." If the benficiary is not entirely dependent on his trust income to live, a trustee may prudently make high-risk
investments because of their high potential returns. Id. at 33. Thus, the beneficiary's
interest is the key to the trust's investment.
Langbein makes the preservation of the trust corpus a moral absolute. But is the
pension beneficiary's interest in the preservation of the trust corpus tantamount to life
itself, as threatened by a murderous foreign regime? Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) for a stratification of such
"economic" rights.
89. The duty and the liability of the fiduciary in both situations is somewhere between absolute liability and no liability. The difference between levels may not be that
great in practice. Troyer, supra note 71, at 129-30. Cf. Cary & Bright, The Delegation of
Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 207 (1974).
Our conclusion remains the same regardless of whether principles of trust
law or corporate law are applied. It is true that trustees are not normally permitted to delegate to others the making of investment decisions for the trust. That
rule reflects the emphasis placed by the typical grantor on the investment expertise of his chosen trustee. But the typical donor to a nonprofit institution focuses
on the welfare of the recipient institution, not upon its investment skill. With
the factor of investment expertise removed from the picture, the trust principles
discussed above seem to us to sanction the delegation of investment decisions by
nonprofit corporations to investment experts.
Id. at 233.
90. The standard that has been applied, is not always the standard that should be
applied. The Uniform Act, supra note 78, is an attempt to change the standard applicable to charitable trusts.
The explicit reference to "unincorporated organizations" seems intended to
make the Uniform Act applicable to charitable trusts. The limitation included in
the definition of "institutional funds" appears to exclude only trust funds held
for the benefit of a charity by a bank, trust company, or other noncharitable
trustee. The fundamental premise of the Act is that application of the traditional trust law fiduciary standards to the investment decisions made by governing boards of universities, hospitals, and other large, nonprofit, institutions
could be debilitating.
Troyer, supra note 71, at 146 n. 65.
The evolution of standards may make qualified persons more willing to work for
charities, because of the decreasing chance of personal liability, and the increasing freedom to act as they see fit for the charity: to serve the community. "Communities that do
not grow and evolve become brittle and frail-become something other than communi-
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discretion of trustees is far wider, in the view of some authorities, than that accorded them by opponents of social investing.
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts allocates a fair measure of
reasonableness to trustees in meeting their responsibilities, and
indicates courts will consider the following when faced with allegations of improprieties:
(1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of the
trust; (3) the nature of the power [being exercised by the
trustees]; (4) the existence or nonexistence, the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which
the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be
judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the power; [and] (6) the existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries. 1
The trust standard in the divestment context covers two issues: the financial implications of divestment, and the relationship of divestment to trust purposes. In meeting these standards, trustees will bear the burden of showing that their
financial judgments were reasonable. In most cases, they will
have to consult investment analysts, and be assured that the advice thereby obtained is not unreasonable. 2
Trust purposes vary widely. There are as many trust purposes as there are trusts.93 On their faces, some trust instruments may mandate divestment, others may never contemplate
divestment, and still others may vary the trust purpose in quixties. To be genuinely free, a commuity must be just; to be sustainable, justice must be
embedded in community." Barber, supra note 6, at 49.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 comment d (1959).
92. Divestment has been attacked as unreasonable, but there are far more irrational
uses of economic power. For example, rumors that Procter & Gamble was supporting
satanism cut into sales of the company's products so much that it stopped using the
century-old logo that had sparked the rumors. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1985, at C3, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1985, at D4, col. 4.
93. The real purpose of most charitable trusts may be tax avoidance. Today's largest
medical foundation began its existence as an unfunded tax scam. See Brinkley, The
Richest Foundation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, § 6 (Magazine) at 32. The general policy
of societal good may, under the right circumstances, override the express intent of a
settlor who never funded a trust until the I.R.S. sued his estate.
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otic or idiosyncratic ways."" A leading authority has maintained
that a trustee may justifiably consider social and moral issues in
making investment decisions regardless of whether there is a
nexus between those factors and the ostensible purposes of the
trust.
Trustees in deciding whether to invest in or retain, the
securities of a corporation may properly consider the social performance of the corporation. They may decline to
invest in, or to retain, the securities of corporations
whose activities or some of them are contrary to fundamental and generally accepted principles. They may con-.
sider such matters as pollution, racial discrimination, fair
employment and consumer responsibility. . . . [Trustees] may well believe that a corporation that has a proper
sense of social obligation is more likely to be successful in
the long run than those that are bent on obtaining the
maximum amount of profits. But even if this were not so,
the investor, though a trustee of funds for others, is entitled to consider the welfare of the community, and refrain from allowing the use of funds in a manner detrimental to society.9 5
94. The only prohibition is that a trust not be set up for an illegal purpose. This rule
could be interpreted as requiring or precluding divestment depending on the decisionmaker. Bequests to charity have at times been limited to a certain percentage of an
estate. See, e.g., Garner v. Purcell, 160 P. 2d 682 (1916). This disbelief that anyone to
whom a large sum of money is given could use it solely for the benefit of others and
obtain it without terrorizing the decedent is the ancestor of the disbelief of foes of social
investment that one can invest a sum of money in a way that makes the world a better
place to live without appearing in the GNP.
Benjamin Franklin created a trust in his will to make loans to artisans for a period
of 100 years. The money was then to be used by the trustee, the city of Philadelphia: a
social investment in the local economy. The trust to the municipality for accumulation
was illegal. But the money did not become a trust for which the city became liable to
private persons, but a gift to the city. In re Franklin's Estate, 24 A. 626 (1892).
With the correct circumstances and a sympathetic judge, trust could be used for
many purposes that might otherwise be beyond the pale. A father who bribed Brazilian
jailers to make conditions less harsh for his imprisoned son was denied reimbursement
from the son's trust, because bribery was against public policy. In re Sage, 97 Misc. 2d
790, 412 N.Y.S. 2d 764 (Albany Co. Sur. Ct. 1979). The court's decision does not reflect
the conditions of the jail or the reason for imprisonment. With the correct factual presentation a court might authorize such an expenditure.
95. A. ScoTT, 3 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.17 (Supp. 1983) cited in Troyer, supra note
71, at 149 n. 78.
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This position may be too broad, but there is no clear-cut decisional authority on point. Langbein's argument that "[slome of
the schemes favored by proponents of social investing are incompatible with these legal standards" relies on only three cases,
the most recent of which dates from 1959.96 Rather than follow
these archaic arcana blindly, trust purposes should be interpreted with an eye to the major purposes of our legal culture as
reflected in prevailing standards of constitutional and interna97
tional law.
The rule of international law is informed by the principle of
reasonableness." If trustees were made to comply with international law obligations, those standards would only require divestment decisions to be made prudently, and to result from a
decision process carefully calculated to minimize the occurrence
of net value losses. Nothing in international law could be construed to compel a trustee to disregard the protection of the
trust corpus. International law does not require divestment to be
a sacrifice, but international law does require reasonable compliance with its mandate.
The most compelling argument against divestment lies in
ERISA, where private pensions are subjected to strict trust standards." Even under this scheme, a careful decision process and
96. Langbein, supra note 1, at 27 n. 90, nn. 93-95; Langbein & Posner II, supra note
1, at 109-110 n. 89, and nn.92-94. National Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. Inland Revenue
Commrs., [1947] 2 All. E.R. 217, [1948] A.C. 31; Deichelmann Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d

659 (1959); Trustees for the Roll of Voluntary Workers v. Commrs. of Inland Revenue,
[1942] Sess. Cas. 47 (Scotland); In re Wilkinson, [1941] N.Z.L.R. 1065.
The real import of these cases is that organizations were denied tax exempt status.
This issue is clearly addressed in our own federal tax laws, making Langbein's analysis
superfluous. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 501(h) (West 1987). See also Troyer, supra note 71, at
151-54.
97. If the terms of a trust conflict directly with the norms of the investment marketplace, it may be impossible for the trust to follow Langbein's hold-the-market strategy.
If Langbein's theory became the legal test, many trusts would revert from charitable
purposes to avaricious remaindermen. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E. 2d
160 (1968), affd 396 U.S. 435. Should not trust purposes evolve and absorb the norms of
society at large and not fall apart when the conflict between concrete provisions and
external reality becomes irreconcilable? There is considerable debate whether the standard of "impossibility" should become "inexpediency" and whether the trust should be
administered at the discretion of the trustee instead of reverting to the remaindermen.
See Comment, Cy Pres Inexpediency and the Buck Trust, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 577 (1986).
98. M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 15 (1981).

99.

Langbein & Posner III, supra note 1, at 96-107. Cf. Ravikoff & Curzan, Social
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reasonable implementation would prevent trustee liability. 10 0
From an international perspective, ERISA should not be construed as the sort of congressional enactment that automatically
overrides other sources of law that could be harmonized with
ERISA without doing violence to the precepts of either source of
01
law.
IV.

IDEOLOGY, ACADEMIC INTEGRITY, AND LAW

Having found Langbein's anti-divestment articles to rely on
a narrow view of law, excluding relevant viewpoints from his discussion of domestic law, and excluding international law from
his view of domestic law, I find it necessary to discuss the basis
of this narrow view in the light of the relationship between ideology and scholarly integrity; that is, when one surveys the law
applicable to a currently debated topic, should one rewrite what
one finds to cast in it the mold of one's ideology. The charitable
view of such academic endeavors is that law and economics is a
field notorious for its narrow viewpoint. Langbein's work is no
narrower than that of his colleagues in the "Chicago School,"
and as the discipline matures it may escape its contextual blindfold and conceptual astigmatism.102 Where academia abuts on
the active practice of law, however, this exercise of viewing the
world through the lens of selective fragmentation, isolating each
fragment from context, distorts the capacity to inform policy decisions with real value options. The net effect of selective fragmentation is selective morality, or perhaps more accurately, selective amorality. Law is a ubiquitous form of social control,
intimately involved in the allocation of the good and bad that
society offers individuals. It is central to public order. 0 3 The saResponsibility and the Prudent Man Rule 68 CAii. L. REV. 518 (1980).
100. - After considering the issues of risk, liquidity, country risk, financial performance
comparative analysis, transaction costs, and the implications of divestment laws, Baldwin and Brown conclude that "the evidence clearly shows that divestment policies can be
financially beneficial for even the largest portfolios." B. Baldwin & T. Brown, supra at
note 20, at 35.
101. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
102. This section in particular draws on the ideas of Walter Probert regarding the
interaction of law and language. See supra note 10.
103. "The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). Cf. supra note 36.
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lience of law to the nature of the public and civic order of the
community makes certain aspects of law and economics very
disquieting.
Since law and law curriculum cut across every value in modern society, the reduction of law to a set of narrow, abstract,
scholastic categories misses both the richness of human experience, and the translation of that experience into a richer predicate for law.10 4 For the scholar who searches for richness to inform his academic product, the process of the common law
springs to mind as eminently qualified as a humane discipline,
suitable for a major role in academic life. The effort to undercut
or short-circuit the common law through economic neo-scholasticism is unfortunate, 10 5 because the long-term effects may be
negative, not only on law as an academic discipline, 10a but also
on practical matters of fundamental importance.' 0 7 Abstract liberty can in practice mean the economic or political enslavement
of others.' 08 Abstract equality can be translated into "separate
104. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policies, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed.
OW. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Holmes's famous statement of legal realism
applies equally well to nonjudicial decisions, such as investing. If a trustee invests in
accord with "the felt necessities of the time," the judge before whom he is forced to
make an accounting will find his actions prudent.
105. For a capsule history of legal philosophies, comparing law and economics to its
forerunners, see Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REv. 451, 453-59 (1974).
106. What is taken as a seminal book for this new sub-discipline was once described
by Arthur Leff as "four hundred pages of tunnel vision." Id. at 452. For an attempt to
integrate law and economics with more humanistic areas of the law, see Malloy, supra
note 38.
107. Scholars have a duty to absorb legal advancements, to be able to articulate their
foundations, instead of iterating trite arguments hoping for a political shift. A new philosophy does little to credit old injustices.
Times have changed. The nation has been embroiled in a renewed debate
over civil rights since the beginning of this decade. Matters once thought settled
are now being challenged, in many cases by the very same persons (e.g. President Reagan) who unsuccessfully but vociferously challenged the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.
Brooks, Civil Rights Scholarship: A Proposed Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 20
U.S.F. L. REv. 397, 398 (1986). See also Bell, supra notes 14 and 25, at 389-91.
108. In the case of South Africa, liberty is being granted to blacks by shunting them
into homelands that have little to do with social reality. But each of those black nations
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but equal" and "separate development"(apartheid)." 9
In economic affairs, economic license has given way to the
moderating influence of anti-trust;" 0 in labor relations, abstract
equality in public employment has been moderated by principles
of affirmative action for suspect classes that experience a disproportionate measure of group stigmatization.'
Economic neoscholasticism demands that we ignore the relationship between
economic liberty and economic license, or the relationship between formal equality and operational discrimination.1 2 This inbecomes the equal of the white nation of South Africa which keeps the lion's share of the
region's resources.
It was the bureaucrats in Pretoria, finally, who determined that there would be
ten black nations. They could just as easily have counted two, three, or twenty.
Black nationalists, of course, count one.
Two or three would have meant the surrender of large amounts of white
land and the creation of black power bases, plausible states, from which a successful challenge to white dominance might have been mounted. Twenty would
have been unmanageable. Ten was an arbitrary compromise, a way of diffusing
the demand for black political rights without being any more ridiculous than
necessary.
J. LELYVELD, supra note 47, at 132.
109. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court never considered whether
the railway accomodations were "equal," because the key question was phrased as
whether the races could be separated in theoretically equal accomodations. In Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), building on cases that had found factual inequality
in separate facilities, id. at 491-92, the Court decided that separate facilities were, in the
abstract, unequal, preventing any argument that truly equal facilities could be used for
segregating the races. Id. at 494-95. South Africans are still playing this game of nice
distinctions, and divestment opponents play along with their game of trustee amorality.
110. Compare the Reagan administration's position on antitrust: Morron, The Administration's Legislation: The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, The National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 612-616
(1985); Campbell, The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan Administration, 64 TEx. L.
REV. 353 (1985).
111. For the history of affirmative action, see Jones, The Genesis and Present Status
of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal, and PoliticalRealities, 70 IOWA
L. REV.901 (1985). The question may be whether affirmative action within our tradition
of individualism is impossible, and should give way to practical solutions which treat
individuals as members of collective groups. See Fox-Genovese, Women's Rights, Affirmative Action, and the Myth of Individualism, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338 (1986). See also
Baldwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. Bakke: The All-America Dilemma Revisited, 30

U.

FLA.

L.

REV.

843 (1978).

112. Ostensibly, many of the elitists have accepted a color-blind ideal as the only
morally correct one for a democracy, and have viewed any threat to that concept
as morally, legally, and philosophically wrong. The elitists have generally ignored
contrary history, or have not given such history weight in their moral judgments.
Instead, they assert that the ideal of a world in which race is irrelevant is the
only one that should have been, and ought to be, accepted in a democratic
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sidious undermining of the norms of non-discrimination that
have been developed in national and international decisional
arenas offends the sense of academic integrity and civic responsibility."' The overt connections between attacking divestment
and supporting racism in South Africa are admittedly well concealed." 4 The literature of race relations frequently contains
code words which have unmistakable connotations to those
aware of personal and institutional ambivalencies and insecurities regarding race; for example, affirmative action being transformed into "reverse discrimination" signals considerable inertia
5
in the process of transforming society to conform to its ideals."
country.

Jones, "Reverse Discrimination"in Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action Programs in The United States, 25 How. L.J. 217 (1982). The real opposition to
ideals of affirmative action only began when "efforts began to translate theoretical rights
into tangible results," id. at 222 (emphasis in original), suggesting the limits of any formal equality.
113. Arguments to prevent change generally draw lines where no reasonable person
would draw them. Either the lines are drawn too close to the heart of hallowed principles
for any movement beyond them to seem reasonable, or the lines drawn are too unreasonable as compared with the status quo to represent reasonable change.
I know that it has frequently been said that you cannot legislate morality. You
can't force people to be good. However, I believe that law should approximate as
far as humanly possible in an imperfect world, goodness, right, and other moral
values which we aspire after. There ought to be an almost automatic alliance
between the law and the right, the true and the beautiful. I might remind you of
what Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, to paraphrase him: You can't legislate
to make my neighbor love me, but I am keenly aware that you should legislate to
prevent him from lynching me.
Tutu, supra note 46, at 2.
114. I believe the law, if it is not to fall into disrepute, must bear a positive
relation to morality, justice, fairness and equity. In South Africa, most of the law
does not have this attribute. It is used to legitimate a vicious, immoral system
unsurpassed since Nazism and Communism. It is such a system that the "constructive engagement" policy followed by the current administration of this land
has helped to continue, a system that cares nothing about even the most elementary human rights. I hope one day that the United States, this great country,
will recover and be true to its tradition to side with those who seek justice, democracy, peace, and equity. For without threatening anyone, we just want to
remind whoever that we will be free, and we will remember those who helped us
to become free.
Id. at 10. When the House approved the recent sanctions against South Africa, there was
a frightening juxtaposition of the administration's postions on human rights in the New
York Times. The President's veto of the sanctions was anticipated in the column next to
the Assistant Attorney General's denouncement of affirmative action as "the major
threat to individual liberty." N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at Al, col. 5 and col. 6.
115.' [T]he term "reverse discrimination" is a popular misconception which has
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Troubling academic questions arise: Does academic flexibility in
the face of societal inertia mean there is no principle which cannot be erased through economic or political power? Is the entire
academic sub-discipline of law and economics being used as a
conceptual code to support the perspective that racism at home
or abroad is licit? Is academic integrity simply a matter of putting discreet, but pernicious content into innocuous symbols; academic disinformation, if you will?" 6 If this is the case, it strikes
at the heart of intellectual integrity"' and in a free society the
future of legal scholarship would be a dismal one should the naremerged recently in American law, particularly in the law of equal employment
opportunity, as a shorthand way of expressing adverse judgment on the validity
of affirmative action. Moreover, while the term as a modern "buzz" word clearly
carries a pejorative connotation, it is rarely accompanied by any legal analysis. It
does have legal significance if it is adopted by a court, but primarily as a conclusion of law which equates illegality.
Jones, supra note 112, at 217.
116. In the words of a minority academician musing on the role of law professors in
society:
It is generally believed that those who built and reside in the castle have
achieved their lofty and prestigious positions through their ability to serve those
who are rulers of the land. The residents of the castle are not the rulers, but
they translate the orders of the real rulers into language which, though arcane,
complex, and beyond the comprehension of even intelligent persons, communicates a sense of power that engenders an awed confusion and a subtle but real
coercion toward compliance. Through the manipulation of those with power the
castle's residents gained a facsimile of power. Only the truly powerful dare describe the authority of the castle's residents in that way.
Bell, supra note 14, at 386.
117. There is more than a tenuous connection between laissez-faire economic due
process of the 1880s to the 1930s and law and economics of the present day.
Nineteenth century views of natural law are rarely followed today, however. Economic due process defended the immutable idea of the "market" from interference of
petty politics through which each segment of society might seek an advantage that would
upset the natural market. See Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of
the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV., 293,
300-01 (1985). Law and economics relies on the same assumptions of market efficiency
and individual liberty, but without the underlying belief that there is a realm of pure
reason from which philosophic principles guide the development of society.
Scientific analysis in the nineteenth century consisted of the exploration of the
ramifications of a given basic fact which could not be questioned. Twentieth century
scientific method relies on the repeated challenging of one's hypothesis against new data.
Langbein and Posner's first article, supra note 1, follows the discredited nineteenth century method, by disingenuously beginning with an examination of the validity of trust
investment in market funds, and arriving at the conclusion that "courts may one day
conclude that it is imprudent for trustees to fail to use such vehicles." Id. at 30.
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row vision of economic neo-scholasticism pre-empt the process
of conceptualization in theorizing about the law in its broadest
sense.

